Michael Lockwood has recently concluded that it can be morally permissible to perform potentially damaging non-therapeutic experiments on live human (pre) embryos. The reasons he provides in support of this conclusion commit him inter alia to the following controversial theses: (I) an organism's potentialfor twinning bears critically on the identity conditions for that organism; and (ii) functionally intact mentalitymediating neurological structures play a critical role in establishing the identity conditions for human organisms. I argue that Lockwood has given us no good reason to endorse either of these theses and, hence, that he has given us no good reason to believe that it can be morally permissible to perform potentially damaging non-therapeutic experiments on live human (pre) embryos.
not fail to give rise to its placenta. So, as it stands, Lockwood's initial attempt at arguing for the moral permissibility of non-therapeutic potentially damaging live human (pre)embryo experimentation fails.
Lockwood's point, though, does not rely upon the mereological status of the placenta. He 
Primitive streak
We do not, therefore, (contra Wamock) possess any good reason to think that "before fourteen days, the human embryo hasn't yet decided how many people it's going to be"7 in virtue of the failure by reductio of the above adumbrated twinning argument. Apparently, twinning can occur "after the formation, at around fourteen days, of the primitive streak, the precursor of the spinal cord".' Neither has Lockwood given us any good reason to believe that arguments based on differentiation fare any better in this regard. At least the argument presented by Lockwood appears clearly to beg the question. It appears, then, that the passage into law of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1991 in England -an Act the conceptual structure of which appears to have been based upon some of the considerations outlined above (although its primary motivations remain obscure) -might have been motivated by a family of egregious, and arguably pernicious, conceptual mistakes.
Apparently, though, this can all be side-stepped by Lockwood: he appears to believe that he need not rely on any of the aforementioned arguments in order to support his conclusion regarding the moral permissibility of performing potentially damaging experiments on human (pre)embryos, for he believes that "the only part of the body on which a human being's identity really depends is the brain; and more specifically that part or aspect of the brain which directly supports mentality". He goes so far as to say: "Just as we now think of a human life as having ended when that part or aspect of the brain in which thoughts and feelings occur has been destroyed, so it seems to me that we ought, in consistency, to think of a human life as not having begun when the relevant part or aspect of the brain has yet to come into existence". ' Just who is being referred to here as the "we" who now think of a human life as having ended merely when a certain proper part of the brain has been "destroyed"? Lockwood appears to be out of touch with current opinion concerning conceptions of human death. There is no indication of which I am aware that the informed majority's view on this matter is anything other than the standard view, viz that a developmentally mature human organism is dead if and only if its whole brain is dead. 8 Lockwood's view is certainly part of only a very small, albeit growing, minority's view of human death -a view which, as I see it, has very little to recommend it. 9 One principal motivation for rejecting such higher-brain-oriented definitions of death (HBODsD) is that this family of definitions appears to commit one to the following implausible theses: First, HBODsD appear currently to presuppose that "destroyed" biological processes (for example, the "destruction" of those neurobiological processes which mediate consciousness in humans) which we do not currently possess the technology to reverse are irreversible. (I take it that this is what is meant by the processes' being destroyed.) But certainly a process's being such that it has not been reversed using current technology is not thereby, merely in virtue of this, a process which is irreversible.
Promises of neuroscience
It seems that HBODsD adherents tend not to place very much confidence in the promises of neuroscience. There is, of course, no in principle reason to think that central nervous system neurons -like some peripheral nervous system neurons -could not, if treated properly, regenerate and reorganise themselves in such a manner that a previously chronically unconscious human organism regained consciousness. It is well known that analogous processes of generation and organisation take place in pre-born human organisms: human fetal development begins in total phenomenal darkness (ie, in complete unconsciousness); consciousness arrives on the scene only when the fetal brain achieves the requisite level of organisation. The attainment of this level of neurobiological organisation is driven, in large part, by a genetic program which operates within a field of developing neurons. There is, therefore, absolutely no reason to believe that the very same genes which earlier govemed the initial organisation of those developing central nervous system (CNS) structures which mediated consciousness in the human fetus and which are, in the ordinary course of events, turned off in adult humans, could not again, at some later time, be turned on. Likewise, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the cellular environment in which the proper neuronal connections were earlier established in the CNS could not again be made hospitable to the development of that degree of neuronal regeneration and reorganisation which would again permit the emergence of human consciousness.
Metaphysical view
Of course, Lockwood might agree that the aforementioned neuroscientific advances are within the realm of physical possibility. He It would be a mistake to counter by claiming, in the following manner, that the above argument proves too much: certainly it is physically possible, by way of intensive biotechnological manipulations, to re-wire and thereby revive some bodies which even whole-brain death adherents would consider to be dead. Thus, given the cogency of the above argument, some humans who are uncontroversially judged to be dead even by whole-brain death criteria would, in fact, not be dead. 
